As you can see, Moral cannot be defined without Right, which cannot be defined without Good, which cannot be defined without Virtue, which cannot be defined without Moral. So within these four definitions, the definitive progress made can be deceiving. Granted, these are abstract words with simplified definitions, but the point stands. The literal definition of words, if pursued far enough, inevitably becomes self-referencial. And because this circularity results in a lack of absolute meaning, words are able to have varying meanings based on how they are perceived. To put it differently, because every person has a unique and constantly changing perspective, the same words are capable of meaning critically different things, not only to different people, but within the same person.

In order to understand Traditional Chinese thinkers’ criticisms of language, it is necessary to at least have a vague understanding of their belief in the Tao, or the underlying order of the universe. For a more developed understanding of Tao, others sources are required, for Tao is notO’Brien 3 my main concern. I am focusing, rather, on language in relationship to Tao, and hopefully in doing so, peripheral light will be shed on Tao. Laozi says that Tao is “forever nameless,” though he does reluctantly concede, “I do not know its proper name; I have styled it ‘Tao.‘” Laozi has trouble naming and describing Tao because it cannot “fit into our conceptual scheme.” Human concept, Liu says, is formed on the basis of “detecting similarities and differences among categories of things.” And so we see that the problem of Tao is that it transcends all divisions, thus it cannot be captured by concepts (Liu 137).

Leaving off from the point of the Tao being inexpressible, one thing should be obvious: If Tao, as the underlying order of the universe is inexpressible, then doesn’t our use of language simply distance us from Being? Zhuangzi said that once we speak and create divisions, we are “discriminating from a perspective, thus necessarily ignoring the other ways of dividing, naming, and thus knowing the world from other perspectives (Ames/Callahan 182). Zhuangzi argues that once a distinction is made, that is, once one perspective wins out above others, we tend to “build up a whole system of names and conversations upon it, denying the existence of other possibilities in the process.” Once this systematization is compete, and the other perspectives mere “ghosts,” then this is what Zhuangzi dramatically refers to as “committing suicide” (Ames/Callahan 182). And so knowing that he feels this way, it is not surprising that he says “The best language is that which is not spoken” (Giles 293).

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